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Abstract
We study the relationship between the distribution of individuals’ attributes over the pop-
ulation and the extent of risk sharing in a risky environment. We consider a society where
individuals voluntarily form risk-sharing groups in the absence of financial markets. We obtain
a partition of society into distinct coalitions leading to partial risk sharing. When individuals
differ only with respect to risk, the partition is homophily-based: the less risky agents congreg-
ate together and reject more risky ones into other coalitions. The distribution of risk affects the
number and size of these coalitions. It turns out that individuals may pay a lower risk premium
in more risky societies. We show that a higher heterogeneity in risk leads to a lower degree
of partial risk sharing. The case of heterogenous risk aversion generates similar results. The
empirical evidence on partial risk sharing can be understood when the endogenous partition of
society into risk-sharing coalitions is taken into account.
Keywords: Risk Sharing, Group Membership, Social Segmentation.
JEL Classification: C71, D3, D71, D81.
∗We thank the Editor, Maitreesh Ghatak, and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments that led to
substantial improvements in this article. We are very grateful to David Bardey, Max Engers, Christian Hellwig,
Laszlo Koczy, Sophie Larribeau, Thierry Magnac as well as to conference participants at Coalition Theory Network
Workshop 2009, the PET 09 Galway, the Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet #9 and the EEA Glasgow meeting
2010, and seminar participants at Université de Lille 1, Tinbergen Institute, Banque de France, Université du Maine,
Université de Strasbourg, Université de Clermont 1, Université de Montpellier 1, SMART (INRA, Rennes), Université
de Cergy-Pontoise and Universidad del Rosario (Bogota).
†Universidad del Rosario, Bogota (Colombia), email: fernando.jaramillo@urosario.edu.co.
‡Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan, 61 Boulevard du Président Wilson, 95235 Cachan France, and Paris School
of Economics, email: hubert.kempf@ens-cachan.fr.
§CREM (Condorcet Center), Université de Rennes 1 and Institut Universitaire de France, email:
fabien.moizeau@univ-rennes1.fr.
1
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1 Introduction.
In developing economies where financial markets are lacking, households protect against income risk
by forming risk-sharing groups and informal networks. However, social exclusion from participa-
tion in community-based arrangements is pervasive adversely affecting the capacity of society to
adequately provide risk sharing to its members. According to the World Bank, “Communities are
not necessarily fair or reliable and can be marked by strong inequalities in power and wealth. They
may exclude vulnerable people (chronically ill, widowed), new entrants (migrants and refugees), or
those who happen to be different (ethnic minorities).” (p.24, World Development Report 2014).
In other words, mechanisms sorting heterogenous agents into different risk-sharing groups uncover
important sources of inequality and poverty.
This paper provides a joint explanation of partial risk sharing and social segmentation based on
the capacity of agents to voluntarily form risk-sharing groups. We study how the segmentation of
society into a plurality of distinct groups derives from utility-maximization behavior when agents
are heterogeneous, leading people not to benefit from the same opportunities to protect against
risk. Our analysis allows us to understand how ex ante heterogeneity among individuals shapes
the pattern of risk-sharing coalitions and thus limits the extent of risk sharing.
The empirical evidence supports the view that households in developing economies are able to
protect consumption against adverse income shocks but full insurance is not achieved (see, among
many others, Townsend, 1994, Kazianga and Udry, 2006).1 Moreover, empirical works stress that
the village is not the relevant risk-sharing unit and informal insurance is implemented into confined
networks and risk-sharing groups (see, among others, Murgai et al., 2001, Fafchamps and Lund,
2003, Dercon and De Weerdt, 2006, Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). Risk-sharing groups form according
to family ties and frienships (see Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), ethnicity (see Grimard, 1997) and
individual characteristics including geographic proximity, age, wealth (see De Weerdt et al., 2006,
Santos and Barrett, 2006, Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett, 2009,
Arcand and Fafchamps, 2012). Using longitudinal South Indian village data, Rosenzweig and Stark
(1989) find that marriage across villages, characterized by particular assortative mating patterns,
i.e. positive assortative mating with respect to persistent attributes of agricultural incomes and a
low correlation between income outcomes, contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability
of the household food consumption.
Formally, we study a society comprised of many individuals, each one characterized by the three
following attributes : risk aversion, endowment and risk, defined as the variance of the distribution
1Townsend (1995), Ray (1998), Dubois (2002), or Dercon (2004) are excellent surveys of the literature.
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from which is drawn an idiosyncratic shock. Individual’s characteristics are public information.
Individuals are characterized by a CARA utility function; they may form a group in order to share
risk. Individuals commit to sharing their resources Pareto-optimally with members of their risk-
sharing group. No specific risk-sharing rule is a priori assumed. We examine the segmentation of
society into such risk-sharing groups. We provide sufficient conditions on Pareto-weights attached
on individuals in the social welfare function for the existence of a core partition. Further, the
corresponding optimal risk-sharing rule can be derived from a Nash bargaining process between
members within each coalition. We show that society can be partitioned into distinct coalitions
when an optimal risk-sharing rule is implemented. Hence, partial risk sharing is likely to arise when
heterogenous agents freely choose their risk-sharing group.
In order to draw sharper conclusions on the link between ex ante heterogeneity among in-
dividuals and the pattern of risk-sharing coalitions we then consider a specific risk-sharing rule:
individuals share the random component of their income equally with members of their risk-sharing
group. We refer to this rule as the mutual insurance rule. Individuals only differ with respect to
their risk. We show that the resulting core partition is unique (under some mild assumptions). It
turns out that the key variable determining the coalition formation process is relative risk hetero-
geneity, as measured by the variance ratios between individuals. This leads the core partition to
be homophily-based: coalitions pool agents similar with respect to the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock. In this perspective, the extent of risk sharing is limited by the formation of coalitions due
to heterogeneity. Two individuals belonging to the same society do not necessarily share risk in
the same coalition.
We study the impact of specific variance schedules on the core partition and show thanks to
these cases how the number and the size of coalitions belonging to the core partition are affected
by the distribution of risk within society.
Defining an aggregate risk premium index and comparing two societies with an equal number
of individuals, we compare the amount of resources devoted to risk sharing. We prove that a more
risky society (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) may devote less resources to risk
sharing than a less risky one. This implies that some individuals may prefer to live in the more
risky society. This result too hinges on relative risk heterogeneity.
Further, we proceed to some comparative statics concerning the size of population. We show
that replication of society does not modify the boundaries of risk-sharing coalitions of the core
partition. On the opposite, the core partition is modified when individuals characterized by new
risks are added to society. It turns out that none of these ways of increasing the size of society,
even though allowing for risk diversification, actually lead to the grand coalition and perfect risk
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sharing.
In order to check the robustness of our approach, we discuss the alternative case where indi-
viduals differ in their aversion to risk. It turns out that agents are willing to pool with the most
risk tolerant agents. Our propositions carry over to this case.
We discuss the empirical consequences of social segmentation on partial risk sharing. We show
that the coefficients of the consumption function’s specification used in econometric studies depend
on the number and size of risk-sharing coalitions. Following empirical studies (see in particular,
Jalan and Ravallion, 1999, and Suri, 2009), we use the average value of the coefficient on individual
income as a measure of the extent of risk sharing. One implication of our approach is that this
coefficient is larger, respectively smaller, when there is more, respectively less, discrepancy between
idiosyncratic shock variances. We also claim that variables such as risk-ratios should be introduced
while assessing the extent of risk sharing.
These results highlight that these two dimensions (extent of risk sharing and aggregate risk
premium) matter for the assessment of risk sharing in society when social segmentation endogen-
ously emerges. Take two societies, one more risky than the other. The more risky society may be
characterized by a higher aggregate risk premium. According to this dimension, we may conclude
that insurance against risk is worse in this society. However, if the more risky society is more ho-
mogenous leading to larger risk-sharing coalitions, then the extent of risk sharing would be larger
which is commonly interpreted as a better insurance outcome.
The relationship between risk and group formation has already been studied by various authors.
In particular, Murgai et al. (2001) develop a model of group formation based on transaction costs
and study the size of insurance groups as well as the quality of insurance. Our model differs
from theirs as group formation relies on ex ante heterogeneity of individuals. In the absence of
commitment, Genicot and Ray (2003) develop a group formation approach where one risk-sharing
coalition must be robust to potential subgroup deviations. This stability condition may limit the
size of the risk-sharing coalition. Bold (2009) solves for the optimal dynamic risk-sharing contract
in the set of coalition-proof equilibria. We depart from these works in two ways. First, we focus on
heterogeneity of individuals’ attributes as the force limiting the size of risk-sharing coalition instead
of the absence of commitment. Second, we study the partition of society into possibly multiple
coalitions. Taub and Chade (2002) study under which conditions a core partition is immune to
future individual defections. Our focus is different as we build a setup that allows us to characterize
a relationship between (i) the risk characteristics of a society, (ii) the membership and size of risk-
sharing groups and (iii) the extent of risk sharing. Our paper bears some similarities with Henriet
and Rochet (1987) who develop a model of endogenous formation of mutuals using a cooperative
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game theoretical approach. They focus on formal insurance activity and do not address the issue
of mutualization of risk under informal insurance schemes. Finally, Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)
develop a model of network formation to tackle the risk sharing issue. As they consider identical
individuals, they do not examine how heterogeneity shapes the architecture of networks.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following section, we present our coalition-formation
framework with individuals differing with respect to the exposure to risk, risk aversion and income
endowment. We then characterize the partition that emerges and study the relationship between
the risk distribution, the size of risk-sharing groups and the extent of risk sharing. In section 4, we
study a coalition-formation framework where individuals differ with respect to their risk aversion.
Section 5 discusses the empirical implications of our theoretical setup. In section 6, we comment
some policy implications of the model and we conclude. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model.
We consider a society I formed of N agents, indexed by i = 1, ..., N . These individuals live T
periods. There is no production in this society and agents are endowed with quantities of a non-
storable good. At each date t, the endowment yit allotted to individual i has a deterministic
component wit and is affected by an idiosyncratic risk εit and a common shock νt:
yit ≡ wit + εit + νt
where νt is i.i.d across individuals and time and normally distributed: νt  N (0, σ2ν). Moreover,
εit is i.i.d. across time and normally distributed: εit  N (0, σ2i )
3. Let the state of nature at each
date t be denoted by ǫt ≡ (νt, ε1t, . . . , εjt, . . . εNt).
Individuals have instantaneous CARA utility functions and, at date 0, agent i is characterized
by the following expected utility function:
Ui = −E0
[
1
αi
T∑
t=1
δt−1e−αicit(ǫt)
]
with E0 the mathematical expectation operator at date 0, αi the absolute risk aversion parameter,
δ the discount factor and cit the consumption of agent i at date t in state ǫt.
2Ghatak (1999), Chiappori and Reny (2005), Genicot (2006), Legros and Newman (2007), also study risk-sharing
groups formation but these works consider that the size of groups is exogenously given.
3Heterogeneity in the variance of εi could be justified by the fact that individuals are differently exposed to risks
because of different technology use (see for instance Conley and Udry, 2010) or different illness shocks (see De Weerdt
and Dercon, 2006).
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Hence, we denote by Γi the vector of individual i’s characteristics:
Γi ≡ (σi, wi, αi).
There is perfect information in the following sense: the various idiosyncratic variances are public
information and the realisations of shocks are also perfectly observed by all agents when they occur.
It is assumed that there are no financial markets allowing any agent to insure himself against his
idiosyncratic risks.
2.1 Risk-sharing Coalitions.
Agents have the possibility to form groups in order to cope with risk according to a given transfer
scheme. Such a group is called a risk-sharing coalition and a partition of the society is a set of
risk-sharing coalitions. More formally, we use the following:
Definition 1 A non-empty subset Sj of I is called a risk-sharing coalition and P = {S1, ..., Sj , ..., SJ}
for j = 1, ..., J is called a partition of I if (i)
J⋃
j=1
Sj = I and (ii) Sj
⋂
Sj′ = ∅ for j 6= j
′.
According to this definition, any individual belongs to one and only one risk-sharing coalition.
The size of the j − th coalition, Sj ⊆ I, is denoted by nj .
We make two key assumptions. First, once risk-sharing coalitions are formed, we assume com-
mitment in the allocation of resources. This is a key difference with, for instance, Genicot and Ray
(2003) or Bold (2009). This commitment assumption allows us to make more transparent the link
between ex ante heterogeneity and the extent of risk-sharing in the society. Second, we require
that the coalition’s resources be Pareto-optimally allocated between members of the coalition and
we do not assume a priori any risk-sharing rule, that is any transfer scheme. For any coalition S
⊆ I, Pareto-optimal allocations of resources between members of S are solutions of the following
program:
max
{cit(ǫt)}
∑
i∈S
µi(S)
(
−E0
[
1
αi
T∑
t=1
δt−1e−αicit(ǫt)
])
subject to the following feasibility constraint at each date t and each state ǫt:∑
i∈S
cit(ǫt) ≤
∑
i∈S
yit(ǫt)
where µi(S) denotes the non-negative Pareto weight attached on individual i belonging to S. At this
stage, in order to be as general as possible, we allow Pareto-weights to depend on the membership
of S.
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It turns out that Pareto-optimal consumptions, denoted by ci (S), are equal to:
4
ci (S) =
1
αi
[
lnµi (S)−
∑
k∈S
lnµk(S)
αk∑
k∈S
1
αk
]
+
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
∑
k∈S
(wk + εk + ν), ∀i ∈ S. (1)
Given a vector (µi(S))i∈S , (ci (S))i∈S is the set of allocations entailed by a given optimal risk-
sharing rule.
Let us denote by ΓS the characteristics of any S ⊆ I
ΓS ≡ {(Γi)i∈S}
and n the size of S. Optimal consumption of individual i in coalition S depends on ΓS as it is
expressed by the characteristics of all members of coalition S and their assigned weight µk(S) in S.
2.2 The Core Partition.
To address the issue of segmentation of society into risk-sharing coalitions, we consider the following
sequence of events:
1. Agents form risk-sharing coalitions and a partition of society is obtained.
2. Individuals commit to applying a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources within the coalition
they belong to.
3. Idiosyncratic shocks are realized. Agents then consume their optimal level of resources.
We solve this coalition-formation game by looking at a core partition defined as follows:
Definition 2 A partition P∗ =
{
S∗1 , ..., S
∗
j , ..., S
∗
J
}
belongs to the core of the coalition-formation
game if:
∄£ ⊆ I such that ∀i ∈ £, Vi(£) > Vi(P∗)
where Vi(P∗) denotes the utility for agent i associated with partition P∗.
According to this definition, a core partition is such that there is no blocking coalition, that is
there is no profitable coalitional deviation.
We focus on two alternative assumptions about Pareto-weights and prove that a core partition
exists when the social welfare function relies on one or the other:
4See for instance Wilson (1968). If we considered a production sector and leisure choice, formulas of Pareto-
optimal consumptions would not be affected if separable utility functions were assumed (see Townsend, 1994). The
good being assumed non-storable, the time subscript is dropped in the sequel.
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Proposition 1 A core partition exists if Pareto-weights satisfy either
(i) Assumption 1
lnµi (S) = Ψ(Γi) + Ω (ΓS) , with Ψ : R
3
+ → R and Ω : R
3n
+ → R, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀S ⊆ I
or
(ii) Assumption 2
lnµi (S) = αi
(
wi −
1
2
σ2i + σ
2
ν∑
m∈S
1
αm
)
, ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀S ⊆ I.
Proposition 1 provides two characterizations of Pareto-weights such that the common ranking
property is satisfied, implying the non-emptiness of the core partition (see Farrell and Scotchmer,
1988, and Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez, 2001). The common ranking property implies that all
individuals agree on the ranking of coalitions to which they belong.
As the risk-sharing rules satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 are located on the Pareto frontier,
Proposition 1 encompasses any allocation of resources derived from Nash bargaining. We show in
Appendix 7.2 how some specific risk-sharing rules, including equal sharing, can be supported by
a Nash bargaining process with identical bargaining power and adequately defined disagreement
points. We then offer the following:
Proposition 2 Depending on the risk-sharing rule used in any coalition, heterogeneity among
individuals may be such that the grand coalition is not in the core.
For an optimal risk-sharing rule and a set of individual characteristics ΓI, it is likely that society
is partitioned into distinct coalitions. Given that individuals commit to sharing Pareto-optimally
the coalition’s resources, perfect risk sharing obtains when the grand coalition belongs to the core.
This proposition amounts to say that commitment to a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources does
not inevitably imply perfect risk sharing when heterogenous agents freely choose their risk-sharing
group. These individual decisions generate the formation of a plurality of risk-sharing coalitions
reflecting the heterogeneity of agents individuals. In other words, the endogenous formation of
risk-sharing coalitions possibly leads to partial risk sharing. The rest of the paper is devoted to
understanding the relationship between heterogeneity and partial risk sharing.
3 Understanding the Impact of Heterogeneity on Risk Sharing.
In order to further explore the relationship between heterogeneity, social segmentation and the
extent of risk sharing, we assume that individuals have the same risk aversion parameter and differ
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according to their endowment and idiosyncratic shock. We then consider the mutual insurance rule
defined as:
ci(S) = wi +
∑
k∈S εk
n
+ ν. (2)
In Appendix 7.2 we show how this rule can be obtained by Nash bargaining. We also show
that the mutual insurance rule is defined by Pareto-weights satisfying Assumption 1 of Proposition
1. When the non-stochastic component is identical for all agents, this rule amounts to the equal
sharing rule5. This rule has the crucial advantage of focusing on transfers among agents solely
justified by the objective of sharing risk among individuals as these transfers relate to the random
components of income. In other words, we abstract from any redistribution motive not related to
risk sharing. All our results will be deduced from this sole rationale.
The expected utility of individual i in group S, Vi(S), is:
Vi(S) = −E
[
1
α
e−αwi−α
∑
k∈S εk
n
−αν
]
.
As we assume a CARA utility function and normal distribution for each idiosyncratic shock, the
Arrow-Pratt formula can be used without approximation losses:
Vi(S) = −
1
α
e
−α
[
wi−
α
2n2
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
−α
2
σ2ν
]
. (3)
We define the certainty-equivalent income for individual i in group S, denoted by ωi (S) , as:
ωi (S) = wi −
α
2
∑
k∈S
σ2k
n2
−
α
2
σ2ν . (4)
The risk premium for any individual i in group S, denoted by π(S), is equal to (α/2)(
∑
k∈S(σ
2
k/n
2)+
σ2ν) and thus is the same for every member of S.
The individual gain for agent i from membership to group S rather than to group S′ amounts
to a reduction in risk premium:
π(S′)− π(S).
In other words, an agent prefers joining a group (provided she is accepted in this group) in which her
certainty-equivalent income is higher. The more risky an agent, the more he benefits from belonging
to a given group rather than remaining alone: individual gains from a group are differentiated and
actually increasing with the riskiness of the agent. This is the core characteristics of a group
functioning under our insurance rule. Hence, the formation of a group relies on the trade-off
5The implications of equal risk sharing on the formation of risk-sharing networks have been studied theoretically
(see Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) and experimentally (see Attanasio et al., 2012). The mutual insurance rule is an
example of a rule sustained by a norm with a private domain as defined by Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2008).
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between heterogeneity and size. Accepting a new member has two opposite effects: on the one
hand, everything else equal, the higher its size, the lower the risk premium; on the other hand,
accepting an individual increases the sum of individual risks leading members to pay a higher risk
premium. Therefore when assessing the net benefit of accepting a given individual, characterized
by a particular variance, an insider has to weigh these two effects.
We have the following set of individual risk aversions:
−→σ I = {σ
2
1, σ
2
2, . . . σ
2
N}
and without loss of generality, we index individuals as follows: for i and i′ = 1, .., N with i < i′ then
σ2i < σ
2
i′ . We will thus say that a lower indexed individual is a“less risky agent”(strictly speaking,
individual risk is associated with the law of motion of εi).
Given these differences among individuals, we define λi ≡ σ
2
i /σ
2
i−1 for i = 2, ..., N. λi is called
the“risk ratio” between agents i− 1 and i. We will use the following:
Definition 3 Any society I can be characterized by a risk-ratio schedule Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} for
i = 2, ..., N .
This risk-ratio schedule captures the relative risk heterogeneity within society.
3.1 The Characteristics of the Core Partition.
In this section, we provide results on the impact of individual heterogeneity with respect to risk on
the segmentation of society in multiple risk-sharing coalitions.
From Proposition 1, we know that under a mutual insurance rule the core is not empty. We are
then able to offer the following:
Proposition 3 A core partition P∗ =
{
S∗1 , ..., S
∗
j , ..., S
∗
J
}
is characterized as follows:
i/ It is unique if
∀z = 2, ..., N − 1,
λz+1 − λz
λz+1 − 1
≥ −
1
z + 1
. (5)
ii/ It is consecutive, that is, if i and i˜ both belong to S∗j then ∀i
′, i > i′ > i˜, i′ ∈ S∗j .
iii/ For any two individuals i ∈ S∗j and i
′ ∈ S∗j′ such that σ
2
i < σ
2
i′, then π(S
∗
j ) ≦ π(S
∗
j′).
The first result, i/, provides a sufficient condition for the core partition to be unique. The
condition on uniqueness depends on the rank of individuals. If the risk ratios are increasing with
the index z, this condition is always met. The condition may appear stringent when λz > λz+1,∀z =
10
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2, ..., N − 1. The expression −1/(z + 1) is an increasing function of z which equals −1/3 when
z = 2, −1/N when z = N − 1, and tending to 0 when N is sufficiently large.6
Turning to the characteristics of the core partition, the second result, ii/, is about consecutivity
which captures the homophily feature. Coalitions belonging to the core partition include agents who
are “close” in terms of exposure to risk. An individual who has to choose between two individuals
in order to form a risk-sharing coalition always prefers the less risky of the pair. This implies that
if an agent i is willing to form a coalition with some other agent i′, then all agents with a lower
risk than i′ are also accepted by i in the coalition.7
The third result, iii/, is in line with consecutivity. Take the less risky individual characterized
by σ21. He is accepted by any possible coalition and chooses the group that incurs the lowest risk
premium. More risky individuals may not be accepted by agents characterized by low risks to pool
resources in a same group. They thus pay a higher risk premium in other coalitions.8
Given the consecutivity property, from now on, we adopt the following convention that for any
S∗j and S
∗
j′ , j
′ > j when σ2i < σ
2
i′ , ∀i ∈ S
∗
j ,∀i
′ ∈ S∗j′ . Another way to express consecutivity is to say
that a core partition can be characterized by a series of “pivotal agents”, that is agents who are
the most risky agents of the coalition they belong to:
Definition 4 Given the coalition S∗j of size nj in the core-partition, the pivotal agent, defined
by the integer pj ∈ {1, ..., N} , associated with S
∗
j and the next agent pj + 1 are characterized by
variances σ2pj and σ
2
pj+1
, respectively, such that:
π(S∗j \{pj}) ≥ π(S
∗
j ) and π(S
∗
j ∪ {pj + 1}) > π(S
∗
j ).
Hence,
σ2pj ≤ [2nj − 1]
∑
k∈S∗j \{pj}
σ2k
(nj − 1)2
(6)
and
σ2pj+1 > [2nj + 1]
∑
k∈S∗j
σ2k
nj2
(7)
6Let us stress that the core partition is generically unique (see for instance Farrell and Scotchmer, 1988) but we
need to provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in order to proceed to our comparative statics analysis.
7The consecutivity property is obtained in other models of risk-sharing agreements (see for instance Henriet and
Rochet, 1987, and Legros and Newman, 2007).
8Let us remark that the CARA specification is not crucial for the results obtained. If we assume an increasing
and concave utility function u(c) and infinitesimal shocks, then using the Arrow-Pratt approximation would yield the
following risk premium for any individual i in group S :
pii(S) = −
u′′ (wi)
u′ (wi)
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
|S|2
.
Hence, the purpose for each individual remains to obtain the lowest ratio
∑
k∈S σ
2
k/n
2.
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for j = 1, ..., J − 1 and σ2pJ = σ
2
N .
A pivotal agent, associated with coalition S∗j , is by the consecutivity property, the most risky
agent belonging to this coalition. He is the ultimate agent for which the net effect of his inclusion in
the coalition is beneficial for all other (less risky) agents belonging to the coalition. Even though he
increases the sum of risks in the coalition (i.e. the numerator of the risk premium), thus inflicting
a loss to their welfare, his addition also increases its size (the denominator of the risk premium).
Actually, his inclusion decreases the risk premium paid by each member of the coalition S∗j . But
if this coalition were to include the next agent, pj + 1, as he is more risky than pj , the net effect
of his inclusion would be negative for all other agents of S∗j . Therefore they prefer not to let him
in. In brief, adding the pivotal agent pj generates the lowest possible risk premium paid by each
member of the coalition S∗j .
Let us remark that the definition of a pivotal agent depends neither on the level of the variance
nor on the degree of risk aversion. The conditions (6) and (7) can be rewritten as:
1 ≤
[2nj − 1]
(nj − 1)2
∑
k∈Sj\{pj}
pj−1∏
z=k+1
1
λz
(8)
and
1 >
[2nj + 1]
n2j
∑
k∈Sj
pj∏
z=k+1
1
λz
. (9)
What matters in the formation of a coalition, is the heterogeneity of the exposure to risk measured
by risk ratios.
Given the consecutivity property of the core partition, the coalition S∗j is fully defined by the
two agents whose indices are pj−1 + 1 and pj . In other words, the core partition is defined by the
set of pivotal agents. Then we are able to offer the following:
Proposition 4 The core partition is characterized by a set of J pivotal agents indexed by pj sat-
isfying (6) - (7) for j = 1, ..., J − 1 and σ2pJ = σ
2
N .
Remark that the last coalition is peculiar. Its pivotal agent is per force agent N who satisfies
condition (6) and not condition (7). We refer to this ultimate coalition as the “residual” risk-sharing
coalition.
Finally, Proposition 4 highlights that, depending on the risk-ratio schedule, the mutual insurance
rule may lead to various risk-sharing groups. The grand coalition belonging to the core obtains
if the relative risk heterogeneity is sufficiently limited, corresponding to a ratio σ2N/σ
2
1 sufficiently
small.
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3.2 Particular Risk-Ratio Schedules.
We have just emphasized the importance of the risk-ratio schedule Λ characterizing a society I in
the endogenous determination of the core partition of this society. In this subsection, we explore
the link between patterns of Λ and the characteristics of the core partition. This allows us to better
understand how heterogeneity affects the way individuals congregate so as to share risk. Formally,
we want to assess the impact of Λ on the series of pivotal agents, i.e. on the number and size of
risk-sharing coalitions.
We restrict the analysis to risk-ratio schedules with simple monotonicity properties: either the
sequence of λi increases, decreases or remains constant. We then offer the following:
Proposition 5 If the risk-ratio schedule Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} is such that:
i/ λi = λ, ∀i = 2, ..N then n
∗
j = n,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
ii/ λi ≤ λi+1, ∀i = 2, ..N then n
∗
j ≥ n
∗
j+1,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
iii/ λi ≥ λi+1, ∀i = 2, ..N then n
∗
j ≤ n
∗
j+1,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
This proposition makes clear that risk heterogeneity affects the core partition, that is the way
agents collectively cope with risk. First, consider the case with constant risk ratios: λi = λ for any
i. From (8) and (9), since inequalities determining the pivotal agent are identical for any club Sj ,
coalitions in the core partition have the same size. It amounts to say that with constant risk ratios
individuals face the same trade-off whatever the level of their exposure to risk when deciding to
form a risk-sharing group.
Second, consider that risk ratio, λi, is increasing with the individual’s index i. The condition
determining p2 implies higher values of the risk ratios than the one determining p1. Hence, ponder-
ing the benefit of increasing size and the cost of bearing risk with agents farther in the distribution
of risk, the size of S∗2 turns out to be smaller than the size of S
∗
1 . Repeating the argument, we find
that the succeeding club sizes decrease.
Third, the case where risk ratio λi is decreasing with the rank of individuals is easily understood
by using a similar argument. Now the cost of forming the second risk-sharing group is lower yielding
its size to be higher than for the first group.
3.3 Risk-Sharing Partitions and Aggregate Risk Premium.
We aim to study the impact of an increase in risk, on the pattern of risk-sharing coalitions and on
the resource cost of dealing with risk. We first define the aggregate risk premium:
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Definition 5 The aggregate risk premium associated with the core partition P is defined as:
π(P) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
πi =
1
N
 J∑
j=1
njπ(Sj)

=
1
N
α
2
 J∑
j=1
1
nj
∑
k∈Sj
σ2k
+ α
2
σ2ν . (10)
The aggregate risk premium is an indicator of the willingness to pay for risk coping, at the
society level. From equation (10), it clearly depends on the core partition.
We should expect that an increase in individual risk lead to a higher aggregate risk premium.
This is obviously true if the coalition structure is taken as given. However this is not necessarily
true when agents form their risk-sharing coalitions as it may happen that the change in the whole
core partition leads to different risk-sharing arrangements, the outcome of which is to decrease the
average risk premium.
This counter-intuitive result is proven in the following:
Proposition 6 Consider two societies I and I′ with εi, respectively ε
′
i, the idiosyncratic risk of
any individual i in I, respectively I′. Assuming that εi SS-Dominates ε
′
i for every i = 1, ..., N , then
society I may be characterized by a higher aggregate risk premium than I′ :
π(P ′) < π(P) (11)
where P (resp. P ′) is the core partition associated with I (I′).
Proposition 6 highlights the fact that if endogenous formation of risk-sharing groups is taken
into consideration, we cannot claim that all individuals pay a higher risk premium in a more risky
society. We consider the case where society I′ is associated with a lower number of risk-sharing
coalitions than I, even though agents face more risk (higher idiosyncratic variances) in I′ than in I,
because as stressed in Proposition 5, this society is characterized by less risk heterogeneity. Hence,
in society I′, risk may be allocated in larger coalitions. In other words, in society I′, individuals
have the possibility to mutualize risk on a larger scale. Thus the sum of these risk premia may
be lower in the more risky society and some individuals will pay lower risk premium and consume
more in this society.
3.4 Varying the size of society.
Our framework allows us to address the impact of a variation of population, that is an increase
of N through the addition of new agents. We distinguish two ways of varying the size of society:
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replicating society or introducing individuals characterized by new risks (new values of σ2i ). We
shall prove that they lead to contrasting results.
We index the type of risk by z, and denote by σ2 (z) the value of the risk type z. If there are
Z types of risks, we order them as follows σ2 (z) < σ2 (z′) for z < z′. The set of risk aversion types
writes
−→σ (I) = {σ2 (1) , σ2 (2) , . . . σ2 (Z)}
We denote by f(σ2 (z)) the fraction of the N individuals with the risk σ2 (z). This allows us to
distinguish between σ2i , the risk borne by agent i, and the z − th type of risk σ
2 (z) . Here we
consider consecutive coalitions as we know that they belong to the core. We are thus able to show
that
Lemma 1 When an individual i with risk σ2(z) is in S all individuals with the same σ2(z) belong
to S.
Therefore, the core partition is characterized by a set of pivotal types of agents, that is a set of
pivotal risks σ2 (p˜j).
For a given coalition S, we denote by−→σ (S) =
{
σ2 (z) , for any z = 1, ..., k
∣∣ ∀σ2i = σ2 (z) , i ∈ S} .
The certainty equivalent income now writes
ωi (S) = wi −
α
2
∑
σ2(z)∈−→σ (S) f(σ
2 (z))σ2 (z)
N
(∑
σ2(z)∈−→σ (S) f(σ
2 (z))
)2 − α2 σ2ν . (12)
Hence, individual i while choosing her welfare-maximizing coalition compares for any ωi (S) and
ωi (S
′). As, from (12), this comparison does not depend on N , we immediately obtain the following:
Proposition 7 The core partition is defined by a set of pivotal risks which depends on the density
function of the risk distribution but is invariant to N.
This proposition states that the relative sizes of types as captured by the density function
matter for the characterization of the core partition. This result is a direct consequence of the
mutual insurance rule which implies that the risk premium is a weighted average of all risks in this
coalition with weights capturing the relative size of a type within the coalition. It turns out that
the trade-off between size and heterogeneity driving the formation of coalitions does not depend on
N .
This proposition allows us to address the case of replication of society I. Let us consider the
integer a and aI is the society derived from I in which there are aN agents, i.e. a copies of any
individual i.
It is immediate to state that
15
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Corollary 1 The replication of society I does not modify the set of pivotal risks.
As replication does not modify the density function, f(σ2 (z)), the set of pivotal risks character-
izing the core partition is unaffected. Of course, the size of any coalition S∗j increases proportionally
with a. Replication reduces the risk premium in each coalition as any individual shares risk with
more individuals belonging to his coalition. In the limit, replication allows to diversify completely
risk leading individuals to bear only the cost of the uninsurable shock, as lima−→∞ π(S
∗
j ) = (α/2)σ
2
ν
for any S∗j in the core partition.
Let us now turn to the case where society is enlarged by the introduction of agents characterized
by new exposures to risk, that is the introduction of new types of agents. This amounts to change
both the size of the population N and the distribution of risks. We start with the set of individual
risks −→σ I = {σ
2
1, σ
2
2, . . . σ
2
N} which generates the core partition P
∗ =
{
S∗1 , ..., S
∗
j , ..., S
∗
J
}
. For
simplicity, let us add an intermediate individual î characterized by a new risk σ̂2 /∈ −→σ I and such
that σ2pj−1 < σ̂
2 < σ2pj . We have the following:
Proposition 8 If one individual î characterized by a new value σ̂2 is added to society I, the set of
pivotal risks may be modified.
The introduction of a new risk modifies inequalities (6) and (7) characterizing pivotal agents
and thus may modify the set of pivotal agents, in contrast with what was obtained when agents
were added to society without changing the set of types. Hence, individual î belongs to coalition
Sj which new pivotal agent denoted by p
′
j can differ from the previous one, i.e. p
′
j ≤ pj . Further,
this change in the boundary of Sj can potentially lead to a change of the whole pattern of risk
coalitions comprising individuals with risks such that σ2 > σ2p′j
. The less risky individual of Sj+1
is now p′j +1. If he has a lower risk than individual pj +1 then the trade-off between heterogeneity
and size determining the membership in Sj+1 is modified. Potentially, this can lead to a pivotal
agent p′j+1 ≤ pj+1.
An intriguing consequence of both propositions is that an increase of population (either an
increase of N without changing the risk distribution or an increase of N with an increase in the
risk type) does not necessarily reduce the number of risk-sharing coalitions nor modify the set of
pivotal risks. Therefore none of these ways of increasing the size of society which could be viewed
as a way to diversify risk actually lead to the grand coalition.
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4 Heterogenous Risk Aversion.
Recent advances in the empirical literature support the evidence of heterogenous risk preferences
(see for instance Ogaki and Zhang, 2001, Mazzocco, 2004, Dubois, 2006, Chiappori et al., 2011,
Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). In this section, we study the impact of heterogenous risk aversion on
the formation of risk-sharing groups and show how the properties of the partition previously found
remain valid.
The model we study is similar to the above setting with two modifications: First, individuals face
the same exposure to risk σ2ε ; second, individuals differ with respect to risk aversion. Without loss
of generality, we index individuals as follows: for i and i′ = 1, .., N with i > i′ then 1/αi > 1/αi′ .
The inverse of risk aversion 1/α being defined as risk tolerance, a lower indexed individual is
characterized by a lower risk tolerance.
Considering the consumption function given by equation (1), the mutual insurance is defined by
lnµi (S) /αi = wi for any i ∈ I. Under these assumptions, the indirect utility function for individual
i in Sj obtains:
Vi(Sj) = −
1
αi
e
−αi[wi−
1
2
1
αi
n2j
(
∑
k∈S
1
αk
)2
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
nj
)
]
.
We denote by πi(Sj) the risk premium evaluated by individual i when belonging to Sj :
πi(Sj) =
αi
2
 1αi1
nj
∑
z∈Sj
1
αz

2(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
. (13)
The risk premium paid by agent i in her risk-sharing group expresses the trade-off on which
the partition of society is based. Accepting a new member in a group pools risk among more
individuals and therefore reduces the risk associated with the group (which is equal to σ2ν+(σ
2
ε/nj)
in equation 13). However accepting a new member affects the coalition average risk tolerance: if
this new member is less tolerant to risk than the average agent in the group, it will decrease the
average risk tolerance and thus increase the transfer in order to be insured against risk. This is
captured by the ratio 11
nj
∑
z∈Sj
1
αz
in equation (13).
Defining the risk tolerance ratio between agent i and agent i − 1 as χi =
1/αi
1/αi−1
for any i =
2, ..., N , the following proposition characterizes the core partition:
Proposition 9 A core partition P∗ =
{
S∗1 , ..., S
∗
j , ..., S
∗
J
}
exists and is characterized as follows:
i/ It is unique if
∀z = 2, ..., N − 1,
χz+1 − χz
χz+1 − 1
≥ −
1
(z + 1)
. (14)
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ii/ It is consecutive, that is, if i and i˜ both belong to S∗j then ∀i
′, i > i′ > i˜, i′ ∈ S∗j .
iii/ For any two individuals i ∈ S∗j and i
′ ∈ S∗j′ such that 1/αi > 1/αi′, then πi(S
∗
j ) ≦ πi′(S
∗
j′).
This proposition is quite similar to Proposition 3. The sufficient condition for uniqueness
parallels equation (5). Consecutivity is a characteristic of the core partition: two individuals are
more likely to congregate the closer they are in terms of risk tolerance. Finally, the less risk tolerant
an individual, the higher the risk premium that this individual is ready to pay. In other words, we
can index coalitions according to the ordering of risk premia.
However, the rationale behind the formation of coalitions and therefore the core partition is
different than in the case of heterogeneity with respect to risk. Now, each agent wants to join a
coalition formed by the most risk tolerant agents as it decreases her risk premium. But the most risk
tolerant agents deny membership to agents with sufficiently high risk aversion who would demand
a too high transfer. Hence the formation of the core partition is obtained by clustering the most
risk tolerant agents into the first coalition, and proceeding sequentially for the other coalitions.
The core partition can be characterized by a set of pivotal agents defined as follows:9
∑
k∈Sj\{pj}
1
αk
−1 + 1
(nj − 1)
√√√√√n2j
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj−1
)
 ≤ 1
αpj
and ∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
−1 + 1
nj
√√√√√(nj + 1)2
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj+1
)
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
 > 1
αpj+1
.
As inequalities defining pivotal agents are homogenous of degree 0 with respect to 1/αi, we also
derive a relationship between the heterogeneity of risk tolerance and coalition’s size:
Proposition 10 If the risk-tolerance ratio χ = {χ2, χ3, ..., χN} is such that:
i) χi = χ, ∀i = 2, ..., N, then n
∗
j = n,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
ii) χi ≤ χi+1, ∀i = 2, ..., N, then n
∗
j ≤ n
∗
j+1,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
iii) χi ≥ χi+1, ∀i = 2, ..., N, then n
∗
j ≥ n
∗
j+1,∀j = 1, ..., J − 1.
9Let us consider Ω(σ2ν) =

−1 + 1
nj
√√√√(nj + 1)2
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
nj+1
)
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
nj
)

 . It is easy to check that it monotonously increases
with σ2ν , ∀nj ≥ 1 and 0 < Ω(0) =
(
−1 + 1
nj
√
(nj + 1)nj
)
< 1 and limσ2ν−→+∞ Ω(σ
2
ν) = 1/nj .
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This proposition is similar to Proposition 5 and can be explained along the same line. What
matters for the shaping of the partition is the heterogeneity with respect to risk aversion, captured
by the risk tolerance ratios, which plays the same role as the risk ratios.10
In brief, our various propositions are robust to the nature of heterogeneity. This heterogeneity
may apply to the utility functions of agents or to the stochastic environment they face, yet it will
trigger identical behaviors which will lead agents to sort themselves into distinct risk-sharing groups
(even though it may happen that the grand coalition forms). Importantly, segmentation of society
into different risk-sharing coalitions does not depend on the levels of idiosyncratic characteristics
such as the exposures to risk or risk aversion coefficients, but on heterogeneity as expressed by the
risk ratios or the risk-tolerance ratios.
5 Empirical Implications of Risk-Sharing Group Formation.
Let us comment on the empirical consequences of the segmentation of society on the extent of risk
sharing.
5.1 Partial Risk-Sharing
Partial risk sharing within society corresponds to the simultaneous rejection of perfect risk sharing
and autarky (see Dercon and Krishnan, 2003).
Most empirical studies test for efficient risk sharing by considering that the conditional expect-
ation of individual consumption equals:
E(cit|
Y It
N
, yit) = κi + βi
Y It
N
+ ζiyit (15)
with Y It ≡
N∑
i=1
yit, and where βi and ζi obtain using properties of conditional expectations of
multivariate normal distributions (see Ramanathan, 1993):
βi =
cov
(
Y It
N , cit
)
var (yit)− cov (yit, cit) cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)
var
(
Y It
N
)
var (yit)−
[
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)]2 (16a)
ζi =
cov (yit, cit) var
(
Y It
N
)
− cov
(
Y It
N , cit
)
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)
var (yit) var
(
Y It
N
)
−
[
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)]2 . (16b)
10 It is irrelevant to search for a proposition equivalent to Proposition 4. Comparing aggregate risk premia obtained
in societies which are not similar in risk aversion and thus value differently the protection with respect to risk has no
economic meaning.
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Equation (15) builds on the well known result that with CARA utility function, individual
consumption at the optimum is a linear function of both global resources and individual income
(see for instance Townsend, 1994).
Denoting by βI ≡
∑
i∈I βi/N and ζI ≡
∑
i∈I ζi/N , we then offer the following:
Lemma 2 Given a partition of the society, if we assume that individuals differing with respect to
risk aversion, risk and income share risk optimally within coalitions, whatever the Pareto-optimal
risk-sharing rule, we get
lim
N−→+∞
βI = 1−
1
nJ
lim
N−→+∞
ζI =
1
nJ
with nJ the average size of risk-sharing groups.
It turns out that risk-sharing group membership is a crucial determinant of the value of βi and
ζi. If the grand coalition is formed, nJ = N implying that lim
N−→+∞
βI = 1 and lim
N−→+∞
ζI = 0. On
the opposite, if individuals decide to pool risk in smaller groups than the whole society I, nJ < N
implying that lim
N−→+∞
βI 6= 1 and lim
N−→+∞
ζI 6= 0. Most empirical studies assume that the relevant
unit to test for efficient risk sharing is the grand coalition. This assumption may be inaccurate and
may explain why the null hypothesis ζI = 0 is rejected.
We thus consider that ζI measures the extent of risk sharing in this society. A higher ζI
means that an individual on average benefits from lower risk sharing. This is congruent with the
interpretation of the estimated value of ζ as a measure of the extent of risk sharing (see for instance
Jalan and Ravallion, 1999, and Suri, 2009).
Retaining the risk exposure as the sole source of heterogeneity, our setup helps us to understand
the impact of risk exposure heterogeneity on the extent of risk sharing as it characterizes the
relationship between this heterogeneity and the size of risk-sharing coalitions. Lemma 2 allows us
to prove the following
Proposition 11 For two societies I and I′, I being characterized by Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} and I
′
being characterized by Λ′ = {λ′2, λ
′
3, ..., λ
′
N}, if λi < λ
′
i , ∀i = 2, ..., N , then the extent of risk sharing
is higher in society I than in society I′.
This proposition highlights the crucial impact of risk heterogeneity on the allocation of risk in
any society. In the more heterogenous society I′, individuals share risk in smaller coalitions, thus
diminishing the extent of risk sharing.
Let us provide an intuition for the proof of Proposition 11 by taking the special case where
λi = λi+1 = λ, λ
′
i = λ
′
i+1 = λ
′ and λ < λ′ whatever i = 2, ..., N . Consider agent 1 in society I.
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Taking into account that membership only depends on the risk-ratio schedule, and pondering the
trade-off between the benefit of size and the cost of higher marginal relative risk, agent 1 prefers
being included in a (weakly) larger risk-sharing coalition in society I than in society I′. From
Proposition 5, the agent following the first pivotal agent faces the same trade-off as agent 1. Hence
the second coalition is of the same size than the first coalition, and consequently is of a larger size
in society I than in society I′. Repeating the argument, we find that the number of non-residual
clubs is (weakly) reduced in the core partition of society I compared to the core partition of society
I
′. The case of decreasing and increasing λis can similarly be dealt with.
Propositions 6 and 11 highlight that the aggregate risk premium index and the extent of risk
sharing must be jointly considered for the assessment of risk sharing when risk-sharing coalitions are
endogenous. Take two societies I and I′ with any εi SS-Dominating ε
′
i and the risk-ratio schedule in
I being characterized by higher risk ratios than the one in I′ such that the aggregate risk premium
and the extent of risk sharing may both be higher in society I′. A larger extent of risk sharing
is commonly considered as desirable when it is assumed that agents are risk averse. However, a
higher aggregate risk premium is viewed as worse insurance outcome as it would lead to a lower
certainty-equivalent income. Hence, reasoning on the variation of the aggregate risk premium or
the extent of risk sharing separately would draw contradictory conclusions about the impact of an
increase in risk on risk sharing performances, at the society level.
5.2 Discussion
Our results suggest that risk heterogeneity rather than the level of risk is the crucial dimension
to understand the allocation of risk in a society. A possible empirical investigation of our model
would be to examine the impact of risk heterogeneity on the extent of risk sharing. In particular,
our model predicts that an increase in λi for some i may lead to smaller risk-sharing coalitions
diminishing the extent of risk sharing.
As in Dubois (2006), a first potential test of this result would be to see whether the null
hypothesis ζi = 0 or ζI = 0 is more likely rejected for societies characterized by larger ratios between
two individuals’ attributes. The evidence obtained by Dubois (2006, p.25), studying the impact on
risk sharing of heterogeneity as measured by the variance of risk aversion, gives some support to
our analysis as he writes “Also the higher is average risk aversion, and the more heterogenous it is,
the more likely full risk sharing is rejected”.
Recent works use disaggregated data and apply dyadic regression analysis to estimate the
probability of a link between a pair of individuals in a network (see Fafchamps and Lund, 2003,
Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007, Arcand and Fafchamps, 2012). Typically, dyadic regressions estimate
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the impact of a difference in attributes as well as of the sum of attributes on the likelihood of a
link. The difference in attributes allows to identify the type of matching (positive or negative)
while the sum of attributes captures the propensity of an individual to join a group conditional on
characteristics. These works find evidence of assortative mating.
Building on their approach, one can envision testing the formation of risk-sharing coalitions
by exploiting the consecutivity property. On the basis of equations (8) and (9) defining a pivotal
agent, the probability of a link between two individuals i and i′, i < i′, depends not only on the
risk-ratio between individuals i and i′ but on the whole series of risk-ratios λz, for z = i+ 1, ...., i
′.
For a given risk ratio σ2i′/σ
2
i , the higher is the risk-ratio between any individual z = i, i+1, ..., i
′−1
and i′ the lower the probability to create a link between i and i′. Introducing the whole series of
risk-ratios in between two individuals as explanatory variables of the probability to create a link
between them would be a way to test for endogenous formation of coalitions.
A further test of the consecutivity property would be to check whether, between three individuals
such that σ2i < σ
2
i′ < σ
2
i′′ , the probability of a link between i and i
′ is significantly higher than the
probability of a link between i and i′′.
As a whole, our theoretical approach suggests that an empirical investigation of risk-sharing
coalitions formation should take into account the whole risk-ratio schedule in society.
Finally, if we relax the exogeneity assumption of exposure to risk, this would not only modify the
risk-sharing coalition partition but also raise econometric issues that should be taken into account
by the suggested tests.
6 Conclusion.
Non-financial risk-sharing arrangements are widely used in developing economies. In the absence
of proper and well-functioning financial markets, agents rely on informal insurance schemes, often
based on social or geographical (a “village”) proximity. Hence it is legitimate to ask how risk-sharing
mechanisms are designed in a society and what are their properties and consequences.
Considering a society without financial markets and relying on a particular insurance rule, we
study the endogenous formation of risk-sharing coalitions. Agents can form any possible group but
commit to remaining in their chosen group whatever the realization of idiosyncratic shocks.
We show that when heterogenous individuals can freely choose their risk-sharing coalitions then
commitment to a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources does not inevitably imply perfect risk
sharing as the grand coalition does not always form.
Then considering the mutual insurance rule, we successively study the cases where individuals
22
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
are heterogeneous with respect to the variances of the idiosyncratic shocks, and their risk aversion.
We obtain a characterization of the core partition of society with respect to risk, depending on the
differentiated idiosyncratic risks borne by individuals. It is unique (under some mild assumptions),
and consecutive: a coalition integrates agents of relatively similar risks. Risk-sharing is efficient
within a coalition. However, there is no full insurance across society. In other words, the amplitude
of risk sharing cannot be studied without precisely taking into account the memberships of risk-
sharing groups and their differences.
Turning to a discussion of the role of risk heterogeneity on the segmentation of society and
focusing on three special cases, we characterize the relationship between the characteristics (i.e.
number, sizes and memberships) of risk-sharing coalitions and the distribution of risk across society.
When the partitions into risk-sharing coalitions of two societies differing in their risk hetero-
geneity are compared, we prove that the extent of risk sharing captured by the average size of
coalitions decreases with this heterogeneity. The link between partial risk sharing and risk hetero-
geneity comes from the partition of society into different risk-sharing coalitions shaped by relative
risk heterogeneity. A more risky society (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) may
devote less resources to risk sharing than a less risky one as it may be less heterogenous, thus less
segmented, and therefore better able to pool individual risks. This illustrates a tension between the
levels of individual variances and their ratios (which express relative risk heterogeneity). Further,
we examine two ways of increasing the size of society and show that even though conducive to risk
diversification they do not lead to perfect risk sharing. Finally, when heterogeneity with respect to
risk aversion is considered, similar propositions obtain.
Several lessons for policy can be drawn from our analysis. First, our results suggest that in order
to increase the extent of risk sharing, sources of heterogeneity among individuals should be reduced.
It is recognized that risk exposures differ among individuals because individuals do not use the same
technology (see for instance, Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993, or Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).
The literature has emphasized that limited knowledge about the new technology or lack of access
to credit are obstacles to technology diffusion (see Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011, and references
therein). Overcoming these impediments is a way to shrink the risk-ratio schedule.
Second, our results suggest that redistribution schemes targeting risk cleavages could be efficient
means to fight against social exclusion. Indeed, a limited redistribution erasing some gaps in the risk
distribution changes the whole pattern of risk-sharing coalitions. Redistribution can thus reshape
the social segmentation in order to increase the extent of risk sharing. This corroborates Chantarat
and Barrett (2012)’s findings that public transfers crowd-in private resources by inducing new
informal insurance networks that help poor people to escape from poverty trap.
23
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Third, there is ample evidence that norms of reciprocity or fairness and social capital are
key determinants of the insurance arrangements11 (see Platteau, 2006). There is thus scope for
public intervention as it may help to coordinate individuals on the specific norm and risk-sharing
rule. Means to build community social capital have been explored to design community-driven
development programs (see World Bank, 1997, Abraham and Platteau, 2002, and Wong, 2012).
Although it is recognized that dictating rules from outside is doomed to fail because people do
not feel obliged to follow them, the training of people in basic rules of govenance and the use of
the existing stock of social capital to build new community-based programs are possible ways to
influence trust and reciprocity.
The present research proves how coalition theory tools can be applied to study the functioning
of an economy in the presence of uncertainty when agents are risk-averse. It can be extended along
several lines, where these tools are also of potential interest.
First, the assumption of full commitment could be relaxed so as to assess the impact of defection
on the number and size of risk-sharing coalitions forming the core partition.
Second, our paper shows that sorting individuals into risk-sharing coalitions affects the extent
of risk sharing over the whole society. This suggests to empirically search for boundaries of groups
as an explanatory link between society’s heterogeneity and the degree of partial risk sharing.
11 In our setup, eventhough the allocation of resources within a coalition is the result of a Nash bargaining between
individuals, social norms still play a key role as they influence the choice of the disagreement point and thus of the
risk-sharing rule.
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7 Appendix.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us consider, for any S ⊆ I, the Pareto-optimal consumptions obtained in the optimal program:
ci (S) =
1
αi
[
lnµi (S)−
∑
k∈S
lnµk(S)
αk∑
k∈S
1
αk
]
+
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
∑
k∈S
(wk + εk + ν), ∀i ∈ S.
Given that E [εk] = 0 and letting n ≡ card(S) we have
E [ci (S)] =
1
αi
[
lnµi (S)−
∑
k∈S
lnµk(S)
αk∑
k∈S
1
αk
]
+
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
∑
k∈S
wk
and
V ar [ci(S)] =
(
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
)2(∑
k∈S
σ2k + nσ
2
ν
)
.
Hence, the certainty-equivalent income for any individual i in S writes as follows:
ωi(S) =
1
αi
(
lnµi (S)−
∑
k∈S ηk (S)∑
k∈S
1
αk
)
,
where
ηk (S) ≡
lnµk (S)
αk
−
(
wk −
1
2
σ2k + σ
2
ν∑
m∈S
1
αm
)
.
We have for any S and S′ ⊆ I, S 6= S′, any i in S and S′,
Vi(S) R Vi(S′)
which is equivalent to
lnµi (S)− lnµi
(
S′
)
R
∑
k∈S ηk (S)∑
k∈S
1
αk
−
∑
k∈S′ ηk (S
′)∑
k∈S′
1
αk
. (17)
Following Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001), the common ranking property is defined as
follows:
Definition 6 A coalition formation game G satisfies the common ranking property if and only if
there exists an ordering  over the set of all possible coalitions in I such that for any i ∈ I and
any coalition S, S′ in the set of all coalitions containing i we have S i S
′ ⇔ S  S′, with i a
preference relation of i in the set of all coalitions containing i.
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We deduce that the common ranking condition is satisfied when
lnµi (S)− lnµi
(
S′
)
= lnµj (S)− lnµj
(
S′
)
,∀i, j in S and S′.
It is immediate to see that this equation is satisfied under Assumption 1.
Under Assumption 2, we have
ηk (S) = 0, ∀k ∈ S
which implies that (17) can be written as follows
αi
2
(
−
σ2i + σ
2
ν∑
m∈S
1
αm
)
+
αi
2
(
σ2i + σ
2
ν∑
m∈S′
1
αm
)
R 0
which is equivalent to
1∑
m∈S′
1
αm
R
1∑
m∈S
1
αm
which does not depend on any characteristics of individual i. Hence, the result.
7.2 Generating Risk-Sharing Rules by Means of Nash Bargaining.
Let us consider that individuals in a given coalition S bargain over the allocation of resources
available in S. Denoting by ǫ the state of nature which belongs to a set A, f(.) the density function,
ci (ǫ) the level of consumption of individual i under ǫ and ci(d) consumption under disagreement,
the Nash bargaining problem writes (see Thomson, 1994)
max
ci(ǫ)
∏
i∈S
(∫
A
u(ci(a))f (ǫ) dǫ−
∫
A
u(ci(d))f (ǫ) dǫ
)
subject to the following resource constraint∑
i∈S
ci(ǫ) =
∑
i∈S
yi (ǫ) , ∀ǫ ∈ A.
We know that the Nash bargaining solution is Pareto optimal, hence risk sharing is optimal
between individuals belonging to coalition S.
Applying the log function and assuming that utility is CARA we have
max
ci(ǫ)
∑
i∈S
ln
(∫
A
1
α
e−αci(d)f (ǫ) dǫ−
∫
A
1
α
e−αci(ǫ)f (ǫ) dǫ
)
subject to the following resource constraint∑
i∈S
ci(ǫ) =
∑
i∈S
yi (ǫ) , ∀ǫ ∈ A.
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Denoting by Ψ(ǫ) the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint, the first-order
condition is written as follows:
e−αici(ǫ)(∫
A
1
αi
e−αici(d)f (ǫ) dǫ−
∫
A
1
αi
e−αici(ǫ)f (ǫ) dǫ
) = Ψ(ǫ) , ∀ǫ ∈ A,∀i ∈ S. (18)
Integrating both sides of (18) we find that∫
A e
−αici(ǫ)f (ǫ) dǫ(∫
A e
−αci(d)f (ǫ) dǫ−
∫
A e
−αci(ǫ)f (ǫ) dǫ
) = 1
αi
∫
A
f (ǫ)Ψ (ǫ) dǫ
which is equivalent to
e−αiωi(S)
e−αiωi(d) − e−αiωi(S)
=
1
αi
∫
A
f (ǫ)Ψ (ǫ) dǫ
leading to
αi
eαi(ωi(S)−ωi(d)) − 1
=
∫
A
f (ǫ)Ψ (ǫ) dǫ.
We thus deduce that for any i, z in S
αi
eαi(ωi(S)−ωi(d)) − 1
=
αz
eαz(ωz(S)−ωz(d)) − 1
. (19)
From (18) and (19) we have
e−(αici(ǫ)−αzcz(ǫ)) =
e−αiωi(S)
e−αzωz(S)
which yields
cz (ǫ) =
αi
αz
ci (ǫ) + ωz(S)−
αi
αz
ωi(S).
Summing over all individuals z in coalition S and taking the feasibility constraint for coalition
S leads to
ci (S) = ωi(S)−
1
αi∑
z∈S
1
αz
∑
z∈S
ωz(S) +
1
αi∑
z∈S
1
αz
∑
z∈S
(wz + εz + ν). (20)
Assuming αi = α, ∀i ∈ I, (19) implies that
ωi(S)− ωi(d) = ωz(S)− ωz(d). (21)
Letting n ≡ card(S), and given (21), (20) becomes
ci (S) = ωi(d)−
1
n
∑
z∈S
ωz(d) +
1
n
∑
z∈S
(wz + εz + ν). (22)
A risk-sharing rule which is obtained by Nash bargaining depends on the choice of consumption
under disagreement. Let us consider the four following cases.
(i) If ωz(d) = ωi(d), ∀i, z ∈ S then the equal sharing rule is obtained as
ci (S) =
1
n
∑
z∈S
(wz + εz + ν), ∀i ∈ S. (23)
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According to (1), the equal sharing rule is obtained when lnµi (S) = lnµ for any i ∈ I which
satisfies Assumption 1 of Proposition 1.
(ii) Assuming that under disagreement the individual consumes his income wi + εi leading to
the following certainty-equivalent income under disagreement
ωi(d) = wi −
α
2
σ2i , ∀i ∈ I.
Introducing this equation in (22) we have
ci (S) = wi −
α
2
σ2i +
α
2n
∑
z∈S
σ2z +
1
n
∑
z∈S
(εz + ν), ∀i ∈ S. (24)
According to (1), it is straightforward to see that this rule is obtained when lnµi(S)α = wi−
α
2σ
2
i
for any i ∈ I which satisfies Assumption 1 of Proposition 1.
(iii) If we assume that under disagreement for any individual i is completely insured and con-
sumes his endowment (which could be interpreted as some subsistence endowment)
ωi(d) = wi, ∀i ∈ S,
then equation (22) can be expressed as follows
ci (S) = wi +
1
n
∑
z∈S
(εz + ν). (25)
which is called the mutual insurance rule. According to (1), it is straightforward to check that it is
obtained when lnµi(S)α = wi for any i ∈ I which satisfies Assumption 1 of Proposition 1.
(iv) Finally, if we assume that under disagreement for any individual i ∈ S his certainty-
equivalent income is
ωi(d) = wi −
α
2n
σ2i .
Equation (22) becomes
ci (S) = wi −
α
2n
σ2i +
α
2n2
∑
z∈S
σ2z +
1
n
∑
z∈S
(εz + ν), ∀i ∈ S. (26)
which has been studied by Baton and Lemaire (1981). According to (1), the Baton and Lemaire
rule is obtained when lnµi (S) = α
(
wi − (α/2n)(σ
2
i + σ
2
ν)
)
, for any i and S, which is Assumption
2 of Proposition 1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
Considering each of these four rules, let us study whether it is possible to find heterogeneity pattern
such that the grand coalition is not in the core partition. For the sake of simplicity let us assume
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that αi = α for any i. Considering the grand coalition I and a coalition S, S ⊂ I, we are going to
show that it is possible to find µi and Γi = (σ
2
i , wi, α) for any i such that coalition S is preferred
by all its members to the grand coalition.
Equal sharing rule. From (23) and considering certainty-equivalent incomes, coalition S is
preferred to I by all its members if and only if∑
k∈S
(
wk −
α
2n
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
))
n
>
∑
k∈I
(
wk −
α
2N
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
))
N
for S ⊂ I.
We denote by S′ the rest of the population not belonging to S, that is I = S ∪ S′. n′ denotes the
size of S′ so that N = n+ n′. The above inequality is equivalent to
(
n+ n′
)∑
k∈S
wk −
(
n+ n′
) α
2n
∑
k∈S
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
)
> n
∑
k∈S∪S′
wk − n
α
2N
∑
k∈S∪S′
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
)
rearranging terms leads to
n′
∑
k∈S
wk − n
∑
k∈S′
wk >
α
2N
[(
n+N
n
)
n′
∑
k∈S
σ2k − n
∑
k∈S′
σ2k
]
+
n′α
2
σ2ν .
Let us consider that wk = w, ∀k ∈ I, we have
0 >
α
2N
[(
n+N
n
)
n′
∑
k∈S
σ2k − n
∑
k∈S′
σ2k + n
′Nσ2ν
]
.
It is always possible to find n′, n, risks σ2k and σ
2
ν such that this inequality is satisfied. For instance,
suppose that n′ = n and that for each k ∈ S we associate z ∈ S′ such that σ2z = 3σ
2
k, the above
inequality can be written as follows
0 >
αn
2N
[(
N − 2n
n
)∑
k∈S
(
σ2k
)
+Nσ2ν
]
.
Hence for n > N/2 and σ2ν sufficiently small, the above inequality is satisfied.
Risk-sharing rule when disagreement point is wi + εi. Given (24) and considering
certainty-equivalent incomes, coalition S, S ⊂ I, is preferred to I by all its members if and only if
α
2n
∑
k∈S
σ2k −
α
2n2
∑
k∈S
(σ2k + σ
2
ν) >
α
2N
∑
k∈I
σ2k −
α
2N2
∑
k∈I
(σ2k + σ
2
ν).
S′ being the rest of the population not belonging to S, that is I = S ∪ S′ and n′ its size, this is
equivalent to
(
n+ n′
)∑
k∈S
(α
2
σ2k −
α
2n
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
))
> n
∑
k∈I
(α
2
σ2k −
α
2N
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
))
.
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Rearranging terms leads to(
n′
(
−1 +
1
n
)
+ 1−
n
N
)∑
k∈S
σ2k + n
′σ2ν <
(
−1 +
1
N
)
n
∑
k∈S′
σ2k.
It is always possible to find n′, n, risks σ2k and σ
2
ν such that this inequality is satisfied. For
instance, suppose that n′ = n and that for each k ∈ S we associate z ∈ S′ such that 2σ2z = σ
2
k, the
above inequality can be written as follows(
−n+ 4−
3n
N
)∑
k∈S′
σ2k + nσ
2
ν < 0.
Hence for n > 4 and σ2ν sufficiently small, the above inequality is satisfied.
Mutual insurance rule. Given (25) and considering certainty-equivalent incomes, coalition
S is preferred to I by all its members if and only if∑
k∈S
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
)
n2
<
∑
k∈I
(
σ2k + σ
2
ν
)
N2
for S ⊂ I.
Denoting by S′ the rest of the population not belonging to S, we can rearrange terms leading
to
(n2 + 2nn′ + (n′)2)
(∑
k∈S
σ2k +
σ2ν
n
)
< n2
(∑
k∈S
σ2k +
∑
k∈S′
σ2k +
σ2ν
N
)
(
2n+ n′
n2
)
n′
(∑
k∈S
σ2k
)
+ σ2ν
(
1
n
+ 2
n′
n2
+
(n′)2
n3
−
1
N
)
<
∑
k∈S′
σ2k
It is always possible to find n′, n, risks σ2k and σ
2
ν such that this inequality is satisfied. For
instance, suppose that n′ = n, the above inequality can be written as follows
3
(∑
k∈S
σ2k
)
+ σ2ν
(
4
n
−
1
N
)
<
∑
k∈S′
σ2k.
Hence if for any z ∈ S′ associated to k ∈ S we have σ2z > 3σ
2
k and for σ
2
ν sufficiently small, the
above inequality is satisfied.
The Baton-Lemaire Rule. Given (26) and considering certainty-equivalent incomes, we can
show that, whatever the heterogeneity pattern, there is no coalition S which is preferred to I by
all its members if and only if
−
α
2n
σ2i +
α
2n2
∑
k∈S
σ2k −
α
2n2
∑
k∈S
(σ2z + σ
2
ν) < −
α
2N
σ2i +
α
2N2
∑
k∈I
σ2k −
α
2N2
∑
k∈I
(σ2k + σ
2
ν), for S ⊂ I.
which is equivalent to
−
1
n
σ2i −
σ2ν
n
< −
1
N
σ2i −
σ2ν
N
, for S ⊂ I
leading to
1
n
>
1
N
which is true whatever n < N.
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7.4 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of (ii): Consecutivity.
By contradiction, let us consider a core-partition P∗ characterized by some non consecutive
groups, that is, there exist individuals i, i˜ ∈ S∗j and i
′ ∈ S∗j′ with i < i
′ < i˜.
Suppose first that π(S∗j ) ≥ π(S
∗
j′). As i < i
′ < i˜ ⇐⇒ σ2i < σ
2
i′ < σ
2
i˜
, we have π(S∗j′) >
π((S∗j′\{i
′}) ∪ {i}), which leads to
∀z ∈ (S∗j′\{i
′}) ∪ {i}, Vz((S
∗
j′\{i
′}) ∪ {i}) > Vz(P
∗).
Second, assume that π(S∗j′) ≥ π(S
∗
j ). We have π(S
∗
j ) > π((S
∗
j \{˜i}) ∪ {i
′}), which leads to
∀z ∈ (S∗j \{˜i}) ∪ {i
′}, Vz((S
∗
j \{˜i}) ∪ {i
′}) > Vz(P
∗).
Hence a contradiction with the fact that P∗ is assumed to be a core-partition.
Proof of (i): Uniqueness.
Let us define pj the most risky agent of the consecutive group Sj\{pj} with size n˜j = nj − 1
satisfying the two following inequalities:
σ2pj ≤ [2n˜j + 1]
∑
k∈Sj\{pj}
σ2k
n˜2j
and
σ2pj+1 > [2n˜j + 3]
∑
k∈Sj
σ2k
(n˜j + 1)2
.
Let us consider the consecutive group Sj whose lowest risk is the one borne by agent i. Given the
definition of the most risky agent, we can introduce the two following functions: Γ(n˜) = n˜/(2n˜+1)
and Θ(i, n˜) = (
i+n˜−1∑
k=i
σ2k)/(n˜σ
2
i+n) with n˜ = 1, ..., N − i + 1. Let us denote by n˜
∗(i) + 1 the size of
group Sj such that:
Γ(n˜∗(i)) ≤ Θ(i, n˜∗(i))
and
Γ(n˜∗(i) + 1) > Θ(i, n˜∗(i) + 1).
It is easy to check that Γ(n˜) is an increasing function of n˜ and Γ(1) = 1/3. Given Θ(i, 1) = 1 > Γ(1),
if Θ(i, n˜) is decreasing with respect to n˜ whatever i ∈ I and n˜ ≤ N − i, then n˜∗(i) is unique as
Γ(n˜) ≤ Θ(i, n˜) for n˜ ≤ n˜∗(i) and Γ(n˜) > Θ(i, n˜) for n˜ > n˜∗(i).
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The function Θ(i, n˜(i)) is decreasing if and only if:
∆Θ(i, n˜) ≡ Θ(i, n˜(i) + 1)−Θ(i, n˜(i)) =
1
n˜+ 1
σ2i+n˜ +
i+n˜−1∑
k=i
σ2k
σ2i+n˜+1
−
1
n˜
i+n˜−1∑
k=i
σ2k
σ2i+n˜
< 0⇐⇒
ψ (i, n˜) ≡ n˜σ2i+n˜ −
(
(n˜+ 1)
σ2i+n˜+1
σ2i+n˜
− n˜
)(
i+n˜−1∑
k=i
σ2k
)
< 0.
Let us consider the function ψ (i, n˜). It is negative for all i, n˜ ≤ N − i if
ψ (i, 1) = σ2i+1 −
(
2
σ2i+2
σ2i+1
− 1
)(
σ2i
)
≤ 0 and ∆ψ (i, n˜) ≡ ψ (i, n˜+ 1)− ψ (i, n˜) ≤ 0.
Defining λi+1 =
σ2i+1
σ2i
, the inequality ψ (i, 1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to(
σ2i+1−σ
2
i
σ2i
)
−
(
σ2i+2−σ
2
i+1
σ2i+1
)
(
σ2i+2−σ
2
i+1
σ2i+1
) = λi+1 − λi+2
λi+2 − 1
≤ 1. (27)
Moreover, ∀n˜ ≥ 1, ∆ψ (i, n˜) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
∆ψ (i, n˜) = ((n˜+ 1)λi+n˜+1 − (n˜+ 2)λi+n˜+2 + 1)(σ
2
i+n˜ +
(
i+n˜−1∑
k=i
σ2k
)
) ≤ 0⇔
λi+n˜+1 − λi+n˜+2
λi+n˜+2 − 1
(n˜+ 1) ≤ 1.
Defining z ≡ i+ n˜+ 1, we can rewrite this inequality as follows:
λz − λz+1
λz+1 − 1
(z + 1)(
z − i
z + 1
) ≤ 1.
As 0 ≤ (z − i) / (z + 1) ≤ 1, we deduce that if for all z = 3, ..., N − 1, λz−λz+1λz+1−1 (z + 1) ≤ 1, then
△ψ (i, n˜) ≤ 0.
Given equation (27), we deduce that if for all z = 2, ..., N − 1, λz−λz+1λz+1−1 (z + 1) ≤ 1 then
△ψ (i, n˜) ≤ 0 and ψ (i, 1) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N.
Hence, when for all z = 2, ..., N − 1, λz−λz+1λz+1−1 (z + 1) ≤ 1, we deduce that there is a unique size
nj for the club Sj .
Proof of (iii): Risk premium ordering.
Consider the first group S∗1 . Let us define the group £j =
{
1, ...., n∗j
}
which is consecutive, com-
prised of the lowest-individual-risk agents and has the same size as group S∗j . From the definition of
the core-partition, we know that, ∀£ ⊂ I, ∀z ∈ S∗1 and £, Vz(S
∗
1) ≥ Vz(£) and in particular ∀z ∈ S
∗
1
and £j , ∀j = 2, ..., J , Vz(S
∗
1) > Vz(£j ) which means that ∀£j , π(S
∗
1) < π(£j ). Moreover, given
the consecutivity property, it is easy to show that π(£j ) < π(S∗j ), ∀j > 1. Hence, π(S
∗
1) < π(S
∗
j ).
Considering the subset I\(S∗1 ∪ S
∗
2 ∪ ... ∪ S
∗
j ), the same argument can be applied for S
∗
j+1 leading
to the result π(S∗1) < π(S
∗
2) < π(S
∗
3) < ... < π(S
∗
j ) < ... < π(S
∗
J−1).
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7.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Let us first denote by Sc(i) any consecutive group whose less risky individual is i. We will denote
by n̂(i) the size of Sc(i) such that n̂(i) = argmaxVi(S
c(i)) in the subset I\{1, 2, ..., i − 1}, for a
risk-ratio schedule Λ. Hence, n̂(i) satisfies inequalities characterizing a pivotal agent:
Γ(n̂(i)− 1) ≤ Θ(i, n̂(i)− 1) (28)
and
Γ(n̂(i)) > Θ(i, n̂(i)). (29)
From Proof of Proposition 3, we know that Γ(n) is an increasing function of n and, under some
condition, Θ(i, n) decreases with respect to n. We can rewrite Θ(i, n) as follows:
Θ(i, n) =
1
n
i+n−1∑
v=i
i+n∏
z=v+1
1
λz
.
Θ(i, n) is a function of i such that:
(i) When λz = λ, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) = Θ(i
′, n) ∀i, i′.
(ii) When λz ≤ λz+1, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) ≥ Θ(i
′, n) for i < i′.
(iii) When λz ≥ λz+1, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) ≤ Θ(i
′, n) for i < i′.
Hence (i), (ii), (iii) and inequalities (28) and (29) lead to Proposition 5.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 6.
Let us consider the two following societies. In society I′, there are N individuals characterized by
σ′2i = 1. Hence, P
′ = {I ′}. In society I, n1 individuals are characterized by σ
2
1 and n2 individuals
are characterized by σ22 such that 1 > σ
2
2 > σ
2
1. Let us choose σ
2
1 and σ
2
2 such that P = {S
∗
1 , S
∗
2}
with S∗1 (respectively S
∗
2) comprised of the n1 (respectively n2) individuals with σ
2
1 (respectively
σ22). Hence, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, n1, n2 and x are such that
n1σ
2
1 + xσ
2
2
(n1 + x)2
>
n1σ
2
1
(n1)2
for all x ∈ {1, ..., n2}
which is equivalent to
σ22 > σ
2
1
2n1 + x
n1
.
As the RHS is an increasing function of x, a sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is
σ22 > σ
2
1
2n1 + n2
n1
.
Thus, given both core partitions, we deduce that
π(P) =
α
2
1
N
(
n1
n1σ
2
1
(n1)2
+ n2
n2σ
2
2
(n2)2
)
+
α
2
σ2ν and π(P
′) =
α
2
1
N
+
α
2
σ2ν .
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In order to have π(P) > π(P ′), σ21 and σ
2
2 must be such that:
σ21 + σ
2
2 > 1.
Clearly there exist σ21 and σ
2
2 that satisfy the following inequalities:
1 > σ21; 1 > σ
2
2; σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 > 1; σ
2
2 > σ
2
1
2n1 + n2
n1
.
For example, take σ21 <
n1
3n1+n2
which satisfies 1 > σ21. As σ
2
1 > 0, we have 1 > 1− σ
2
1. Notice that
σ21 <
n1
3n1+n2
is equivalent to 1− σ21 > σ
2
1
2n1+n2
n1
. So that for any σ22 such that 1 > σ
2
2 > 1− σ
2
1, the
four inequalities are satisfied.
7.7 Proof of Lemma 1.
By contradiction, let us assume that two individuals i and j with σ2i = σ
2
j = σ
2(z) are such that
i ∈ S and j /∈ S. From (6), if i ∈ S, then
σ2i ≤ [2n− 1]
∑
k∈S\{i}
σ2k
(n− 1)2
(30)
with n being the size of S. But, from (7) if j /∈ S, then
σ2j > [2n+ 1]
σ2i +
∑
k∈S\{i} σ
2
k
n2
. (31)
As by assumption σ2i = σ
2
j , this inequality implies that(
n2 − 2n− 1
)
σ2i > [2n+ 1]
∑
k∈S\{i}
σ2k. (32)
When n ≤ 2, n2 − 2n− 1 < 0, then the LHS of (32) is negative while the RHS of (32) is positive.
This leads to a contradiction. When n > 2, n2 − 2n− 1 > 0, equations (30) and (32) imply
2n− 1
(n− 1)2
>
2n+ 1
n2 − 2n− 1
leading to
1 >
2n− 1
2n+ 1
>
n2 − 2n+ 1
n2 − 2n− 1
> 1
which is a contradiction. Hence the result.
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7.8 Proof of Proposition 8.
We look for a condition such that the introduction of î with risk σ̂2 modifies the set of pivotal
agents. For simplicity, we focus on S1 characterized by σ
2
p1 satisfying (6) and assume that an
individual characterized by σ2p1 + ε, ε arbitrarily small, would not have been accepted in S1
σ2p1 + ε >
(
2nj + 1
n2j
) ∑
k∈S1\{p1}
σ2k + σ
2
p1
 . (33)
Let L ≡ σ2p1 − σ
2
p1−1
> 0 and σ̂2 ≡ σ2p1−1 + δ, L > δ > 0. Obviously, î is accepted in S1\{p1}.
Let us show that for given values of L and δ, we can find ε such that î is accepted in S1\{p1}
and p1 is rejected by S1\{p1} ∪ {̂i}. Formally, the rejection of p1 is written as
σ2p1 >
(
2nj + 1
n2j
) ∑
k∈S1\{p1}
σ2k + σ̂
2
 . (34)
A sufficient condition for (34) given (33) writes
2nj + 1
n2j
(L− δ) > ε.
As the LHS of the above inequality is strictly positive, it is always possible to find a distribution
of risks with a value of ε sufficiently small such that this inequality is satisfied.
7.9 Proof of Proposition 9.
Existence. It is easy to see that in our case the common ranking property is also satisfied. Hence,
a core partition exists.
Proof of (ii): Consecutivity. By contradiction, let us consider a core-partition P∗ charac-
terized by some non consecutive groups, that is, there exist individual i, i˜ ∈ S∗j and i
′ ∈ S∗j′ with
i < i′ < i˜.
Suppose first that πz(S∗j ) ≥ π
z(S∗j′) for any z = 1, ..., N . As i < i
′ < i˜⇐⇒ 1/αi > 1/αi′ > 1/α
i˜
,
we have
∀z ∈ (S∗j′\{i
′}) ∪ {i}, Vz((S
∗
j′\{i
′}) ∪ {i}) > Vz(P
∗).
Second, assume that πz(S∗j′) ≥ π
z(S∗j ) for any z = 1, ..., N . We have
∀z ∈ (S∗j \{˜i}) ∪ {i
′}, Vz((S
∗
j \{˜i}) ∪ {i
′}) > Vz(P
∗).
Hence a contradiction with the fact that P∗ is assumed to be a core-partition.
Proof of (i): Uniqueness.
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Knowing that the core partition satisfies the consecutivity property, an individual z is accepted
if and only if
−
n2j
(
∑
k∈S
1
αk
)2
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
≥ −
(nj + 1)
2
(
∑
k∈S
1
αk
+ 1αz )
2
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
(nj + 1)
)
which amounts to
−
(
1
αz
)2
n2j
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
−
(
1
αz
)
2n2j (
∑
k∈S
1
αk
)
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
+ (
∑
k∈S
1
αk
)2
(
(2nj + 1)σ
2
ν + σ
2
ε
)
≥ 0.
For positive αz, the LHS of the above inequality is positive if and only if
∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
1
αz
nj
−nj +
√√√√√(nj + 1)2
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
(nj+1)
)
(
σ2ν +
σ2ε
nj
)
 ≤ 1.
The aim is to show that the LHS of this inequality is monotonously increasing with the size of
the coalition.
First, the expression
−nj +
√√√√√(nj + 1)2
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
(nj+1)
)
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
nj
)
 is increasing with respect to n (we omit
j for convenience) if and only if:
2
[
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
n
] [
n+
σ2ε
σ2ν
]
+
[
2n+ 1 +
σ2ε
σ2ν
]
σ2ε
σ2ν
(35)
> 2
[
n+
σ2ε
σ2ν
]√[
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
n
] [
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
(n+ 1)
]
.
Using the fact that[
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
(n+
1
2
)
]2
>
[
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
n
] [
n(n+ 1) +
σ2ε
σ2ν
(n+ 1)
]
we can show that inequality (35) is satisfied whatever σ2ε/σ
2
ν and n.
Second, we offer a sufficient condition such that the ratio
∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
1
αz
nj
increases with respect to
the size of the coalition Sj , i.e. ∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
+ 1αz
1
αz+1
(nj + 1)
−
∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
1
αz
nj
≥ 0
which is equivalent to (
nj −
1
αz+1
1
αz
(nj + 1)
)∑
k∈Sj
1
αk
+ nj 1
αz
≥ 0.
40
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Let us define Φ(i, n) ≡
(
n−
1
αi+n+1
1
αi+n
(n+ 1)
)(
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
)
+ n 1αi+n and show that Φ(i, n) ≥ 0,
∀n ≥ 1.
We have Φ(i, 1) = (1−
1
αi+2
1
αi+1
(2))
(
1
αi
)
+ 1αi+1 .With χi ≡
1/αi
1/αi−1
< 1 whatever i, Φ(i, 1) is positive
if and only if
1 ≥
χi+2 − χi+1
1− χi+2
, whatever i = 1, ..., N.
Let us show that Φ(i, n) is monotonously increasing with respect to n, that is,
Φ(i, n+ 1)− Φ(i, n) =
(
n+ 1−
1
αi+n+2
1
αi+n+1
(n+ 2)
)(
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
+
1
αi+n
)
+ (n+ 1)
1
αi+n+1
−
(
n−
1
αi+n+1
1
αi+n
(n+ 1)
)(
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
)
− n
1
αi+n
which is equivalent to
Φ(i, n+ 1)− Φ(i, n) =
(
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
)(
1−
1
αi+n+2
1
αi+n+1
(n+ 2) +
1
αi+n+1
1
αi+n
(n+ 1)
)
+
(
1−
1
αi+n+2
1
αi+n+1
(n+ 2)
)
1
αi+n
+ (n+ 1)
1
αi+n+1
⇔
Φ(i, n+ 1)− Φ(i, n) =
(
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
)
(1− χi+n+2(n+ 2) + χi+n+1(n+ 1))
+ (1− λi+n+2(n+ 2))
1
αi+n
+ (n+ 1)
1
αi+n+1
.
We have
Φ(i, n+ 1)− Φ(i, n) =
((
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
)
+
1
αi+n
)
(1− χi+n+2(n+ 2) + χi+n+1(n+ 1)) .
Hence,
Φ(i, n+ 1)− Φ(i, n) ≥ 0⇔ 1 ≥ (n+ 1)
(χi+n+2 − χi+n+1)
(1− χi+n+2)
.
With z ≡ i+ n+ 1, we can rewrite this inequality as follows
1 ≥ (
z − i
z + 1
)(z + 1)
(χz+1 − χz)
(1− χz+1)
.
As 0 ≤ (z − i) / (z + 1) ≤ 1, we deduce that if for all z = 3, ..., N − 1, χz−χz+1χz+1−1 (z + 1) ≤ 1, then
△Φ(i, n) ≥ 0. We deduce that if for all z = 2, ..., N − 1, χz−χz+1χz+1−1 (z + 1) ≤ 1 then △Φ(i, n) ≥ 0 and
Φ(i, 1) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N.
Proof of (iii): The proof is identical to Proof of (iii) of Proposition 3 except with the fact
that the risk premium π(Sj) must now be replaced by π
z(Sj).
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7.10 Proposition 10.
Let us define Γ˜(n) ≡
−n+
√√√√√(n+ 1)2
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
n+1
)
(
σ2ν+
σ2ε
n
)

−1
and Θ˜(i, n) ≡ 1n
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
1
αi+n
. We will denote
by n̂(i) the size of Sc(i) such that n̂(i) = argmaxVi(S
c(i)) in the subset I\{1, 2, ..., i − 1}, for a
risk-ratio schedule Λ. Hence, n̂(i) satisfies inequalities characterizing a pivotal agent:
Γ˜(n̂(i)− 1) ≥ Θ˜(i, n̂(i)− 1) (36)
and
Γ˜(n̂(i)) < Θ˜(i, n̂(i)). (37)
From Proof of Proposition 9, we deduce that Γ˜(n) is a decreasing function of n and, under some
condition, Θ(i, n) increases with respect to n. We can rewrite Θ(i, n) as follows: 1n
i+n−1∑
k=i
1
αk
1
αi+n
Θ(i, n) =
1
n
i+n−1∑
v=i
i+n∏
z=v+1
1
χz
.
Θ(i, n) is a function of i such that:
(i) When χz = χ, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) = Θ(i
′, n) ∀i, i′.
(ii) When χz ≤ χz+1, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) ≥ Θ(i
′, n) for i < i′.
(iii) When χz ≥ χz+1, ∀z = 2, ..., N, then Θ(i, n) ≤ Θ(i
′, n) for i < i′.
Hence, (i), (ii), (iii) and inequalities (36) and (37) lead to Proposition 10.
7.11 Proof of Lemma 2.
Let us first consider that the grand coalition is formed and individuals allocate Pareto-optimally
the grand coalition resources. Given (1), we have for any i in I:
ci (I) =
1
αi
[
lnµi (I)−
∑
k∈I
lnµk(I)
αk∑
k∈I
1
αk
]
+
1
αi∑
k∈I
1
αk
∑
k∈I
(wk + εk + ν), ∀i ∈ I. (38)
Given (38) the conditional expectation of individual consumption is used by econometricians
when testing for the perfect risk sharing hypothesis:
E(cit|
Y It (ǫ
I
t)
N
, yit) = κi + βi
Y It
N
+ ζiyit (39)
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where the formulas of βi and ζi are obtained by using properties of conditional expectations of
multivariate normal distributions (Ramanathan, 1993):
βi =
cov
(
Y It
N , cit
)
var (yit)− cov (yit, cit) cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)
var
(
Y It
N
)
var (yit)−
[
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)]2 (40a)
ζi =
cov (yit, cit) var
(
Y It
N
)
− cov
(
Y It
N , cit
)
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)
var (yit) var
(
Y It
N
)
−
[
cov
(
Y It
N , yit
)]2 . (40b)
Given (38), some straightforward computations lead to the following
βi =
1
αi∑
k∈I
1
αk
(Nσ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N )
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
)
−
(
Nσ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
−
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)2
ζi =
1
αi∑
k∈I
1
αk
(
Nσ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
− (Nσ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N )
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
−
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)2 .
Hence,
βi =
1
αi∑
k∈I
1
αk
N
and
ζi = 0.
Second, let us now assume that optimal risk sharing takes place in subset S ⊂ I. It turns out
that Pareto-optimal consumptions can now be written as follows
cit =
1
αi
[
lnµi −
∑
k∈S
lnµk
αk∑
k∈S
1
αk
]
+
1
αi
n∑
k∈S
1
αk
∑
k∈S(wkt + εkt + νt)
n
, for i ∈ S (41)
which is equation (1). If we still consider (39) and use the latter expression of cit to compute (40a)
and (40b), it turns out that coefficients βi and ζi are equal to:
βi =
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(nσ2ν +
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
N )
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
)
−
(
nσ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
−
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)2 (42)
ζi =
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(
nσ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
− (nσ2ν +
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
N )
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)
(
σ2ν + σ
2
i
) (
σ2ν +
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2
)
−
(
σ2ν +
σ2i
N
)2 (43)
Dividing by (σ2i )
2 both the numerator and denominator in (42) and (43) leads to:
βi =
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
σ2iN
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)
−
(
nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1N
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
+
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
σ2iN
2
)
−
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1N
)2 (44)
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ζi =
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(
nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
+
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
σ2iN
2
)
− (nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+
∑
k∈Sj
σ2
k
σ2iN
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1N
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
+
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
σ2iN
2
)
−
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1N
)2 . (45)
If we assume that limN→∞(σ
2
N/σ
2
1) <∞, this implies that
lim
N→∞
σ2N
Nσ21
= 0.
Further, as (
∑
m∈I σ
2
m)/(N
2σ2i ) ≤ σ
2
N/(σ
2
1N) ∀i = 1, ..., N, we thus easily deduce that when
limN→∞(σ
2
N/σ
2
1) <∞, then
lim
N→∞
∑
m∈I σ
2
m
N2σ2i
= 0,∀i = 1, ..., N.
If N tends to infinity, the following equalities obtain:
βi ≃
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
σ2iN
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)
−
(
nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
)
−
(
σ2ν
σ2i
)2 (46)
ζi ≃
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(
nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
)
− (nσ
2
ν
σ2i
+
∑
k∈S σ
2
k
σ2iN
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
)
(
σ2ν
σ2i
+ 1
)(
σ2ν
σ2i
)
−
(
σ2ν
σ2i
)2 . (47)
As limN→∞(σ
2
N/σ
2
1) <∞ implying that limN→∞(
∑
m∈I σ
2
m)/N
2σ2i = 0 and limN→∞(
∑
k∈S σ
2
k)/σ
2
iNn =
0 ∀i = 1, ..., N, we get:
βi ≃
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
(n− 1) (48)
ζi ≃
1
αi∑
k∈S
1
αk
. (49)
If we assume that each individual belongs to one risk-sharing coalition only, and society I is
organized into J risk-sharing coalitions, denoting by βI ≡ (
∑
i∈I βi)/N and ζI ≡ (
∑
i∈I ζi)/N we
immediately get:
lim
N→+∞
βI = 1−
1
nJ
(50)
and
lim
N→+∞
ζI =
1
nJ
(51)
with nJ ≡ N/J.
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7.12 Proof of Proposition 11.
We will denote by Sc(i) the consecutive club whose lowest risky agent is individual i. Let us denote
by n̂( i|Λ) the size of Sc(i) such that n̂( i|Λ) = argmaxVi(S
c(i)), for a risk-ratio schedule Λ.
We first offer the following Lemma
Lemma 3 For two societies I and I′ characterized respectively by Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} and Λ
′ =
{λ′2, λ
′
3, ..., λ
′
N} with λz < λ
′
z for z = 2, ..., N, we have n̂( i|Λ) ≥ n̂( i|Λ
′).
Proof. Let us denote by Θ(
−→
λ i,n) ≡ Θ(i, n) =
1
n
i+n−1∑
v=i
i+n∏
z=v+1
1
λz
with
−→
λ i,n = (λi+1, λi+2, ..., λi+n−1).
Hence for two vectors
−→
λ i,n and
−→
λ′ i,n where λ
′
z > λz, ∀z = i + 1, ..., i + n − 1, we have Θ(
−→
λ i,n) >
Θ(
−→
λ′ i,n), ∀i ∈ I and ∀n = 1, ..., N − i + 1. Given inequalities (28) and (29) and that Θ(
−→
λ i,n) >
Θ(
−→
λ′ i,n), it is thus easy to deduce that the optimal size of the consecutive group beginning with
agent i is larger under Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} than under Λ
′ = {λ′2, λ
′
3, ..., λ
′
N}. Hence, Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Let us denote by pSc(i) the pivotal agent of any consecutive club S
c(i). For any society
I, any i′ < i we have pSc(i) > pSc(i′).
Proof. We know that σ2pSc(i) satisfies
σ2pSc(i) ≤
[
2ncj − 1
] pSc(i)−1∑
k=i
σ2k
(ncj − 1)
2
(52)
and
σ2pSc(i)+1 >
[
2ncj + 1
] pSc(i)∑
k=i
σ2k
ncj
2
. (53)
Let us consider the consecutive club Sc(i′) = {i′, ..., pSc(i)+1}. By assumption on the individuals
ordering, we have
pSc(i)∑
k=i
σ2k
ncj
>
pSc(i)∑
k=i′
σ2k
n′cj
for any i′ < i.
Hence as 2n
′+1
n′ <
2n+1
n for any n
′ > n, we thus have
σ2pSc(i)+1 >
[
2ncj + 1
] pSc(i)∑
k=i
σ2k
ncj
2
>
[
2n′cj + 1
] pSc(i)∑
k=i′
σ2k
n′cj
2
, for any i′ < i.
We easily deduce that pSc(i) > pSc(i′) for any i
′ < i.
Let us now define p∗j (Λ) the pivotal agent of club Sj in the core partition associated to Λ.
Let us consider individual 1. Using Lemma 3, for Λ = {λ2, λ3, ..., λN} and Λ
′ = {λ′2, λ
′
3, ..., λ
′
N}
with λz < λ
′
z for z = 2, ..., N, we deduce that p
∗
1(Λ) ≥ p
∗
1 (Λ
′) . Using Lemma 4, we thus deduce
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that p∗2(Λ) ≡ p
∗
Sc(p1(Λ)+1)
(Λ) > pSc(p1(Λ′)+1)(Λ). Using again Lemma 3 allows us to say that
pSc(p1(Λ′)+1)(Λ) ≥ p
∗
Sc(p1(Λ′)+1)
(Λ′) ≡ p∗2(Λ
′). Hence p∗2(Λ) ≥ p
∗
2(Λ
′). Iterating this reasoning until
j = J allows us to say that p∗j (Λ) ≥ p
∗
j (Λ
′) for any j = 1, ..., J. Hence for any i = 1, ..., N we thus
deduce that the number of pivotal agents associated with Λ such that p∗j (Λ) ≤ i compared to the
number of pivotal agents associated with Λ′ such pj (Λ
′) ≤ i is lower for Λ than Λ′. Hence the
average size of coalitions is larger with Λ rather than with Λ′. Thus, from Lemma 2, the extent of
risk sharing depends on the average size of clubs and thus is higher in I than in I′.
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